Sylvia Plath and Electracy by Clinton, Alan Ramón
Iowa Journal of Cultural Studies
Volume 8, Issue 1 2006 Article 6
POETRIES
Sylvia Plath and Electracy
Alan Ramo´n Clinton∗
∗
Copyright c©2006 by the authors. Iowa Journal of Cultural Studies is produced by The Berkeley
Electronic Press (bepress). https://ir.uiowa.edu/ijcs
Alan Ramón Clinton currently teaches interdisciplinary writing at Northeastern University in Boston. He
is the author of Mechanical Occult: Automatism, Modernism, and the Specter of Politics.
Iowa Journal of Cultural Studies 8/9 (Spring & Fall 2006)
Copyright © 2006 by The University of Iowa
Sylvia Plath and Electracy
Alan Ramón Clinton
I. The Impossible Archive
Sylvia Plath’s short story “Johnny Panic and the Bible of Dreams,” written in
1958, reads like an archival fantasy. Its narrator, a secretary in a mental hospital,
spends each day “facing the door of the office and [typing] up other people’s
dreams” (17). In media-technology terms, this task already presents a problem, as
dreams operate on the level of the Lacanian imaginary in addition to the symbolic
register recorded by the typewriter. The talking (or typing) cure, which attempts to
convert dreams into discourse, is, according the media theorist Friedrich Kittler in
Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, the final, ultimately futile “attempt to establish
writing under media conditions” (90). Hence, the Bible of Dreams can only succeed
to the extent that it does not limit itself to bibliographic methods. But then, what is
a poet, the archivist who, Plath writes, “must forget the dreamer and remember the
dream” (26), to do about this media gap?
The simple answer is that the poet, often figured as a “secretary of dreams” in
cultures where writing and print have been the primary mediums of communication,
can do nothing about this gap. Rather, I hope to argue that Plath’s poetic project,
envisioned in “Johnny Panic and the Bible of Dreams” and most fully realized in the
Ariel poems (including those poems written at the time of the Ariel compositions
but not collected in the volume), involves not, as Kittler argues about Freud, estab-
lishing writing under media conditions, but instead bringing writing into media
conditions. Whereas secretarial dream poets have either relied on transcendent
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inspiration (“Caedmon’s Hymn”) or lamented the interference of dream signals
(Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan”), Plath’s later poetry intuits the rhetoric of the digital
age. In fact, by drawing on media theorist Gregory Ulmer’s definition of “electracy” as
a conductive or, as he has also called it, “punceptual” logic which brings different
concepts together based on their concrete similarities rather than their abstract con-
nections, one might argue that Plath’s Ariel poems are most effectively read as switch-
boards that privilege neither the historical nor the personal, but instead shift from one
register to the other, conductively rather than inductively or deductively, with the
result of illuminating both. This argument requires reading the Ariel poems as
mediumistic events, but with an emphasis on the technological definitions of the word
“medium.” The very definition of the word in fact had a technical meaning long before
it had a spiritual one, suggesting that even spiritual or poetic mediums are primarily, as
originally defined, a matrix for conducting or transporting alien substances.
In reality, the spiritual/poetic and technological definitions of “medium” are not
fundamentally opposed. As I have argued in my book Mechanical Occult, spiritu-
alist mediums have always expressed and envisioned their powers in technological
terms.1  Reading Plath in this manner, however, will further problematize the limiting
effects of “confessional” approaches to her work. What sort of confession, after
all, can mediums perform? As Helen Sword instructs in Ghostwriting Modernism,
the spiritualist medium’s enunciations are characterized by “multiple perspectives,
fragmented discourse, and simultaneous claims to authority and passivity” (x)
rather than the unified subjectivity implied by confessional discourse. Given these
properties, the message of the medium is the message as discourse network.
Consequently, “Johnny Panic and the Bible of Dreams” can be read as an “appa-
ratus poetica,” a discourse on poetry as an archival technology, rather than the
more traditional ars poetica. The story lays out the poetic issues that were already
preoccupying Plath and hints at the forms their ultimate articulation might take. As
previously mentioned, the story envisions dreams as the medium of the poet, but
not in the sense that they are the medium of the analyst:
Dream by dream I am educating myself to become that rare char-
acter, rarer, in truth, than any member of the Psychoanalytic Insti-
tute, a dream connoisseur. Not a dream-stopper, a dream-explainer,
an exploiter of dreams for the crass practical ends of health and
happiness, but an unsordid collector of dreams for themselves
alone. (17-18)
Unfortunately, this connoisseurship involves many practical problems. While the
narrator bypasses the reductionist conversion of dreams into medical discourse,
she still participates in a process of inscription inimical to the imaginary register in
which dreams operate. This process is made even more problematic by its extreme
inefficiency. Due to the numerous intrusions characteristic of any clinic, the narra-
tor must “reread what [she] has typed several times, under the pretense of careful
proofreading, in order to memorize the dreams” (21). Once committed to memory,
these dreams are reinscribed at home in a personal notebook. The narrator is only
too aware of the inadequacy of her methodology.
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These problems are exacerbated by the size of the task at hand. Even typing
these dreams for eight hours a day, five days a week, the narrator still doesn’t
“touch a fraction of them the city over” (18). Rather, the world’s dreams comprise
their own archive without limits. As the narrator dreams about these dreams, they
constitute “a great half-transparent lake stretching away in every direction, too
big... to see the shores of it, if there are any shores” (19). Interestingly, the narrator’s
awareness of this endless dream archive can only be realized in a dream of her own,
suggesting not only her own interiority with respect to the archive, but also that
information can only be properly (without loss of information) archived in its origi-
nal medium. The limits of this process are realized in “the Borges fable in which the
cartographers of the Empire draw up a map so detailed that it ends up covering the
territory exactly” (Baudrillard 631). The solution to such analogue dilemmas, as
Baudrillard and others point out, is to convert (condense) media into a digital
system that can return (reproduce) the analogue data at a later point. With digitality,
there are few (if any) limits to the speed and reproducibility of data.
If this formulation seems to place Plath too far ahead of her time, one might look
to Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” for
the necessary qualification. In his discussion of Dadaism, Benjamin suggests that
the most innovative arts always seek effects “which could be fully obtained only
with a changed technical standard” (237). Just as the Dadaists attempted to achieve
the effects of cinema before its possibilities had been fully implemented, so Plath, I
would suggest, attempted to achieve the effects of digitality before it became a
popular technology. In both of these cases, artists have taken an already existing
but not yet developed technology and intuited its future goals. The invention of
cinema in 1895 allowed for the sort of practical theorization of the Dadaists twenty
years later (and Benjamin’s analysis twenty years after that), while Plath’s The
Colossus was published in 1960, almost equidistant between Alan Turing’s famous
conceptualization of the universal discrete machine (and Benjamin’s essay) and
IBM’s 1981 introduction of the IBM “PC” or “personal computer.”
Indeed, The Colossus bears the same name as the computer Turing built in 1943
to decode German war transmissions, although Turing’s machine remained so se-
cret that the American ENIAC (1946) held the undisputed title as the world’s first
digital computer until the 1970s. Nevertheless, Plath finds herself, in the volume’s
title poem (CP 129-130), facing a problem similar to the one faced by the narrator of
“Johnny Panic and the Bible of Dreams,” an archive that can only be properly
implemented and accessed via digital means: “I shall never get you put together
entirely, / Pieced, glued, and properly jointed.” Tellingly, the impossibility of this
task is framed in the discourse of craftsmanship. Only the term “jointed” has even
the hint of industrialized labor. Turing’s COLOSSUS was so named due to the size
of the task before it: “The strategic secrets of the Führer’s headquarters,
Wolfsschanze, could, as is logical, only be cracked by a monster computer” (Kittler,
Gramophone 257). The fate of a world war, in other words, could only be entrusted
to a device capable of, as Cassius says of Julius Caesar in Shakespeare’s play about
the emperor, “bestrid[ing] the narrow world / Like a Colossus” (1038). Indeed, only
a statue whose legs were reputed to span either side of the harbor at Rhodes could
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provide a fitting name for the machine designed to unite German intelligence with
the British Isles. Similarly, Plath’s self-appointed task of rebuilding the Colossus is
similar in scope to the “Bible of Dreams” commissioned by Johnny Panic, whose
last name suggests even more global proportions than the Colossus.
As opposed to Turing’s COLOSSUS, which converted encrypted radio frequen-
cies back into intelligible discourse, Plath’s malfunctioning Colossus speaks in
encrypted radio static: “Mule-bray, pig-grunt and bawdy cackles.” Yet, as Kittler
notes, “only [complete] nonsense, white noise without information and hence of
no use for the upper echelons, provides complete proof against spying”
(Gramophone 256). The very fact that the Colossus is a machine guarantees that it
can be reassembled, decrypted. Plath is correct in noting that “[i]t would take more
than a lightning-stroke / To create such a ruin,” for it is electricity itself that allows
such a device to operate. As “Mouthpiece of the dead,” the Colossus may have
reverted to that turn-of-the-century technology, the gramophone, but as a being
that operates with “immense skull-plates,” it becomes, like Plath herself, an electri-
cally driven cyborg.
II.  A Grounding in Electracy
Plath’s biography, which one might read as an intensified biography of her age,
allows her special access to the issues at stake in the electronic era, including the
conductive rhetoric that Ulmer terms “electracy.” First, Plath was well aware of
Freud and his “Electra Complex,” an association no doubt intensified by the actual
loss of her father Otto at the age of nine. Her life thus Otto-mated, Plath associates
her father with electricity throughout her life. In a short story called “Among the
Bumblebees,” written near the time of her first shock treatments,2  the narrator
recounts “Alice” experiencing thunderstorms with her father:
Sitting on her father’s lap in the den, watching the waves spray
against the sea wall, Alice learned to laugh at the destructive gran-
deur of the elements. The swollen purple and black clouds broke
open with blinding flashes of light, and the thunderclaps made the
house shudder to the root of its foundations. But with her father’s
strong arms around her and the steady reassuring beat of his heart
in her ears, Alice believed that he was somehow connected with the
miracle of fury beyond the windows, and that through him, she
could face the doomsday of the world in perfect safety. (264)
And yet, despite (or because of) her father’s connective properties, Otto is also
deeply associated with disconnection. Weeks before Otto’s death, his advanced
diabetes required that his leg be amputated. Plath, literalizing Lacan’s metaphor,
founds her subjectivity with a cut and the subsequent attempts to overcome it.
Nevertheless, overcoming such a disconnection is a task more impossible than
recording the world’s dreams or rebuilding the Colossus, one whose fulfillment can
only be imagined as a high-tech form of surgery.
Given these parameters, it would be hard to overestimate the unintended psy-
chological effects that electroshock therapy exerted upon Plath’s imagination. Plath’s
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biographer Paul Alexander describes the “day’s routine” as follows:
Metal probes were placed on Sylvia’s temples so that powerful
dosages of electricity—“shocks”—could be shot through her body.
...In later years, standard medical procedure would demand that
doctors administer electroshock therapy only after the patient was
given a muscle relaxant and a general anesthetic. Also, a doctor or
nurse would stay with the patient during the recovery period, to
provide support and counseling. In the case of Sylvia Plath, none
of this happened. Because she had taken no muscle relaxant, her
body was rigid with fear. Because she had received no anesthesia,
she was, in effect, nearly electrocuted. (119-120)
The intensity of this trauma, which led to her first suicide attempt, would forever
rewire Plath’s sense of human identity. This rewiring was the result and simulta-
neously more intense form of a general shift in attitude that had begun over fifty
years before. In his book Discourse Networks, Kittler reminds us that, by the end of
the nineteenth-century, psychiatrists almost universally described the brain as “a
network of telegraphic ‘relay stations’ with more or less prompt connections” (279).
Indeed, it was this concept that led to the invention of shock therapy in the first
place. Still, there is a big difference between absorbing a cultural epistemology and
having one’s “psyche ripped open by [the] raw wattage” (Alexander 120) of an
idea, and it is this latter form of embodied rhetoric which, in addition to her poetic
abilities, places Plath in a unique cultural position.
These various material, linguistic, and epistemological encounters with electricity
allow Plath access to a certain form of thought that Greg Ulmer defines as “electracy.”
Electrate thought, characteristic of the post-McLuhan era, privileges conductive (as
opposed to inductive or deductive) procedures more characteristic of dreamwork and
poetry than traditional logic. As opposed to the hierarchy of concepts that argumen-
tative rhetoric demands, electracy organizes ideas based upon distributed networks of
concrete similarities—the emphasis is on connection rather than abstraction (1–10).
The uncanny tendency of keywords, when typed into search engines, to bring forth
widely divergent topics, provides an example of how computers operate according to
a set of procedures that in another setting might be called a “playful use of language.”
But computers do not play in the traditional sense, unless one defines play as a
merciless application of concrete poetics.
What’s at stake in wedding Sylvia Plath’s poetics to electronic logic and the
development of computer technology? Not only will it further contribute to the
waning prestige of confessional approaches to Plath, which tend to marginalize her
cosmopolitan concerns and reiterate the ideology of separate spheres on the level
of literature and criticism, but it also complicates our sense of the relationships
between historical references and the personal and lyric agendas in Plath’s writing.
On a broader level, the alliance of poetic and digital logics described by Ulmer and
evinced by Plath will necessitate a reevaluation of poetry’s relationship to other
genres (such as the analytical essay) that are traditionally considered more “criti-
cal” in nature. Perhaps an understanding of digital technology and the decentered,
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networked structures of global power arising from it will require that we all become
connoisseurs of poetry’s ability to make unexpected connections, where its con-
ductive logic operating within media conditions will help us navigate the hidden
structures animating the ever-expanding archive of the spectacle.
III. Electracy and Ethics
In a controversial article entitled “The Sweatshop Sublime,” Bruce Robbins frankly
addresses the difficulties Marxist scholars have not only with the recognition of
globalism’s complexities but with strategizing meaningful action when the struc-
tures of injustice are recognized:
 [C]ontemplating the obscure infinity of the social whole ... mak-
ing us sense that we possess transcendent powers (albeit pow-
ers exercised on our behalf and in this case without our active
will) yet finally letting us “sink back into ourselves,” so that we
fail to express those powers in any potentially risky, disobedient
action, I suggest that we provisionally call this trope, with a cer-
tain inevitable discomfort, the sweatshop sublime. (85)
Those things that make “disobedient action” seem impossible or, even worse,
futile, are well-known to Marxist scholars. First, globalism not only appears to us as
an “obscure infinity,” but multinational corporations and nation-states deliberately
obscure the means by which they operate, effectively (they hope) closing off their
archives to antagonistic investigators. The second source of futility comes from
the role of the scholar as investigator in the first place, which places him or her in a
position of limited individual power, often lacking the means or even the knowledge
of how to form viable collectives of “praxis.” What disturbed many readers of this
article seems to me not the first element of the “sweatshop sublime,” which hinges
on the formidability of one’s opponents, but the latter suggestion that part of this
formidable nature lies in everyone’s (including Marxist scholars’) default position
as an individual in the capitalist global economy.3  Sensitive to charges that they are
lacking in “commitment,” such scholars are unable to acknowledge the negative
dialectics in Robbins’ method, designed not to “out” Marxists for tenure but to
describe a basic difficulty with which the committed intellectual must always struggle.
In effect, contemporary scholars of globalism find themselves in a position simi-
lar to that of the narrator of “Johnny Panic and the Bible of Dreams”—working on
a colossal task with inadequate means. A similar sense of inadequacy must have
haunted Plath in the isolated London apartment where she wrote the bulk of the
Ariel poems. Alone, cut off from the outside world to an extent that must have
reinvoked her relationship to her father, Plath began to write poems whose connec-
tions between the individual and the global is more vexed than one might expect
from someone in her situation. And yet this is precisely why a reappraisal of Plath’s
poetics, in the context of Marxist theory and Gregory Ulmer’s theory of electracy,
could prove instructive.
Why, for instance, did Plath choose to name what was to be her final volume
Ariel? No doubt Ariel’s association with magical speed fascinated Plath, as it did
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the makers of the contemporary communications satellite also named Ariel. In addi-
tion, the Shakespearian Ariel’s poignant relationship to imprisonment/
noncommunication and servitude (reinforced by the satellite’s interrupted trans-
missions due to U.S. bomb testing) must have influenced Plath. Undoubtedly Plath
saw herself, to some extent, playing Ariel to Ted Hughes’s Prospero, a relationship
which acknowledges Hughes’s public power but also her own superior moral (and
perhaps poetic) position. But ultimately, moral arguments must pale in comparison
to the fantasy of speed itself, intoxicating in its own right but also appealing to
someone who felt time to be of the essence, whether stemming from suicidal fore-
knowledge or, more likely, the brutal existence of a single mother attempting also to
be a creative individual. A brief glance at the dates of the Ariel poems will clue in the
casual reader to the speed with which they were written. Several critics, most notably
A. Alvarez and Timothy Materer, from whom I depart only in my technological inflec-
tion of mediumship, have mystified Plath’s bipolar tendencies in such a way as to
suggest that the Ariel poems were written in an almost medium-like state. As previ-
ously noted, the emergent media at the time of Plath’s composition beg the question to
what extent electric, even electronic, speed informs Plath’s volume, not only themati-
cally but in its deep structure as well. Robin Peel, for instance, writes, in yet another
defense of Plath’s use of Holocaust imagery, that “what the existence of another
contemporary meaning of Ariel, that of a communications satellite damaged by nuclear
radiation, allows us to consider is the possibility that this poem [“Ariel ”] has a con-
temporary association that has gone unremarked” (182). But what Peel fails to remark
is that such associations are in fact at the heart of the question of how the individual
can begin to remark on political matters in the first place, connect to them in a way that,
by operating outside ethics (what ethics does a machine have, or one who writes like
a machine?), creates the conditions in which ethics are possible.
Do the Ariel poems then suggest means by which one may, if not bestride the
globe, at least make sorties across the chasm between global realities and indi-
vidual situatedness? Take, for instance, the notorious “Daddy” (CP 222-4), a poem
which more than any other has been the instance of virtuosity, and embarrassment,
necessitating defenses of a poet who would use imagery of the Holocaust to depict
her personal problems. On some level, every critic acknowledges this is what Plath
is doing here. To do otherwise would strain the limits of credibility. From here, one
can dismiss Plath as a histrionic bourgeois confessionalist, excuse her metaphors
as the products of a truly troubled, even depersonalized mind, or laud Plath as
having the courage to address taboo yet politically urgent subject matter. All these
arguments, as I’ve suggested, are ethical in nature and as such, to some extent,
posit (usually unconsciously) Plath as an individual subject making choices as to
how she will represent herself, how she will confess. But is that what “Daddy,” or
the “medium-like” poems of Ariel as a whole, are really doing?
Although the poem’s title would seem to suggest a confessional, family-romance type
poem, the first stanza begins by rejecting this genre as nothing more than a fairy tale:
You do not do, you do not do
Any more, black shoe
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In which I have lived like a foot
For thirty years, poor and white,
Barely daring to breath or Achoo.
It is from this stifling, pedestrian situation that the poem wants to escape. Thus, we
are witnessing a flight from the personal to history, terms which, we will soon see,
become irrelevant to the electronic logic, if not the ethical effects, of Plath’s
mediumistic poetry. In an explosive sneeze, an “Achoo,” we are transported to
another context, “Ach, du,” a pun that is unmotivated except from the standpoint of
sound, coincidental, allowing the poem to open out onto history, the Holocaust.
What is most interesting here is that Plath seems to have constructed a machine for
moving between various spheres that are normally considered to have no relation-
ship to one another. It works by being formalistic, encourages connectivity by
working on the level of the concrete rather than the abstract, an unpredictable
conductivity which is utopian in its promise of a method for overcoming Robbins’s
“sweatshop sublime,” that feeling of being overwhelmed in the face of globality. In
this way, the poetic energy of personal suffering is reinforced by the pathos of
suffering on a larger scale and vice versa. What Ulmer has termed a “relay system,”
operating on the basis of linguistic coincidence, makes questions of personal mo-
tivation or “the right to speak” seem less urgent in comparison to the highly politi-
cized interpretive methods suggested by the Ariel poems. If Plath’s methods are
taken seriously by Marxist critics, the question of personal commitment is amelio-
rated by the possibility that, starting from the most isolated of positions, one can
“chance upon” answers to questions presented by our global economy—that is,
as long as one entertains the idea that the critic of the future must add poetic
methods to her analytical repertoire.
In fact, Ulmer stresses how poetic thought, a natural accomplice to digital logic,
is key to overcoming the separation of spheres that plagues all individuals living in
a capitalist society which discourages integrating seemingly random events into a
more total understanding (and thwarting) of alienation: “The wide image [or puncept]
is revealed in this illumination as a pattern that repeats across the discourses... a
cognitive map of its maker’s ‘psychogeography’” (81). In his use of the terms
“cognitive map” and “pyschogeography,” Ulmer reveals his indebtedness to the
ideas and Marxist goals of Fredric Jameson and the Situationists. In his concept of
a “wide image” that “repeats” a “pattern,” Ulmer implies that contemporary Marxist
thought must occur in the context of poetic practice as theorized by Jacques Derrida
in his notion of grammatology. Derrida, in fact, starting with Of Grammatology’s
discussion of “writing beyond the line,” has repeatedly acknowledged his theory’s
indebtedness not only to literature but to the shifts in cognition resulting from the
transition(s) between print culture and electronic culture. That Plath’s writing oc-
curs contemporaneously with these shifts, that she lived simultaneously parallel
to, through, and in advance of electracy, makes a general mediumistic rereading of
her poetry all the more compelling.
In this rereading, Plath’s father returns as the Colossus, a “[g]hastly statue with
one gray toe / Big as a Frisco seal,” but this time Plath seems to have derived the
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equipment (Ariel as communications satellite) if not to crack her father’s code, then
to perform an even greater feat in learning how to deterritorialize it. Plath/Ariel
cannot locate the father because the name of his hometown “is common.” A friend
reveals “there are a dozen or two.” The resulting dissemination forecasts Derrida’s
famous method of using the common nouns in authors’ “proper” names (Genet as
“broomflower,” Ponge as “sponge”) as a means of finding “signatures” which may or
may not have been intentionally left in their respective writings. In keeping with this
drift towards commonality, Ariel /Plath “thought every German was you” and “the
language obscene” in a sense that does not reduce the multiplicity of the Latin ob.4
Rather, it is a language that works against the “scene” in all its enclosed senses, a
language which the poem calls “An engine, an engine / Chuffing me off like a Jew.”
These lines do not bring the Holocaust to Plath, but Ariel towards the Holocaust,
although the linguistic engine being used, unlike the trains on their way to the death
camps, is reversible, travels in both directions at once, a train moving at the behest of
a “conductor” which, in this case, is not an individual but a means of electronic travel.
Such an engine, simultaneously poetic and electric, operating outside of ethics,
in fact lays the groundwork for the ethical move par excellence, traveling beyond
the self toward the other, which is always also a traveling from an other to a self. It
neither trivializes the suffering of the individual (Plath) nor the tragedy of the group
(the European Jews who were, of course, always individuals whose suffering mat-
tered because they were individuals), but allows for communication between the
two. Plath’s great discovery as a poet was this mechanization of empathy, pathologi-
cal as it may or may not have been, Electra-cal and electric in a manner anticipating the
electronic logic Ulmer has chosen to call “electracy.” Therefore, one who reads Plath
as primarily a confessional poet, or even merely “a poet” rather than the “modest
recording instrument” which André Breton presciently held out as the ideal toward
which a poet must strive (123), inevitably fails to recognize that Plath’s true signifi-
cance, her truest humanity, lies in her ability to become, in the Ariel poems, a modest
conducting instrument far more deserving of the Shakespearian (and Hebrew5 ) name
than a communications satellite created by engineers rather than conductors. In read-
ing poems like “Daddy,” whatever the motive, in means that privilege the individual,
where so-called external references always radiate back towards the nuclear family
romance, we become the nuclear radiation that damages the Ariel poems in their
function as a satellite communicating empathic, politically charged message.
IV. Conducting the Satellite
Plath’s poetry, therefore, not only develops what Ulmer calls an “electrate” rhetoric
but, in poems like “Daddy,” teaches us how to read it in alternative ways. A poem
like “Burning the Letters” (CP 204–5), written in August of 1962, thereby evinces an
exhilaration whose interest extends beyond Plath’s relationship to Ted Hughes:
A red burst and a cry
That splits from its ripped bag and does not stop
With the dead eye
And the stuffed expression, but goes on
Dyeing the air,
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Telling the particles of the clouds, the leaves, the water
What immortality is. That it is immortal.
The message of the burning letters is tautological, but their powers of transporta-
tion are astounding, more aligned with the communicational speed of Ariel, with
digital instantaneity, than with a more traditional literate rhetoric. Then comes Octo-
ber 1962 and the famous “Bee Poems,” where the exhilaration of the electronic
“buzz” turns, momentarily, to fear:
How can I let them out?
It is the noise that appalls me most of all,
The unintelligible syllables.
It is like a Roman mob,
Small, taken one by one, but my god, together. (CP 213)
In “The Arrival of the Bee Box,” the speaker ultimately decides to set the bees free,
ostensibly to calm her fears, but perhaps unconsciously allowing the “unintelli-
gible syllables” to disperse, like encrypted ethical pollen, throughout Plath’s future
poems and poetic method. By the time Plath arrives at “Daddy” eight days later, her
“weird luck” (223) could also be read as “wired” luck. The Colossus, however,
burdened with remnants of the bourgeois lyric “I,” is left broken in favor of the
disseminated, disobedient signals carried by Roman, Gypsy, Jew, or bee satellites.
The critic who follows these phonetic rewirings in more and more unpredictable
directions has begun to read Plath’s Ariel period as she herself was reading it,
conducting a panic dream archive in a manner more in line with Kittler’s update of
Freudian and Marxist hermeneutics than with traditional semiotics. In this impos-
sible yet navigable archive, one rewires Lacan’s famous formulation to read, “The
global is structured like a cybernetic language.”
Hence, we hear it in “Fever 1030” (CP 231-232) when “[t]he tinder cries” even as
we explore the visual and conceptual possibilities when “tinder” and “tender” are
linked. In this system of punceptual connectivity, the radiating heat of a fever
becomes “Radiation... // Greasing the bodies of adulterers / Like Hiroshima ash and
eating in.” This simile, in its absurd connection of adultery and the victims of
Hiroshima, foregrounds the often arbitrary and labyrinthine moral justifications for
murder. It is a self-justifying, domesticated logic, “eating in” rather than “radiating
out” in the syllabic flight Plath has discovered. One must reach Hiroshima because
it stands alongside the Shoah in the outer limits of human capacity for destruction,
and it is necessary to understand the individual logics that lead there. One way of
achieving these moments of insight and empathy, the beginnings of more complete
understandings and interventions, is to open the “box of maniacs” (CP 213) and
allow their “unintelligible syllables” to land on unlikely flowers, perhaps those
popping from the grave of “Lady Lazarus” (CP 244–47), the controversial poem
defended on grounds of its foregrounded performativity (Strangeways 385). In this
latter poem, however, we have a speaker—and hopefully a reader—who is less a
woman, even a performing Lazarus, than a network assembled for our consider-
ation, “a million filaments” conducting the personal life, history, ideology, “the strip
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tease” of spectacle, the “trash,” the “Flesh, bone,” the “wedding ring.” When this
network claims, “I am your opus,” an electrate reader should take this as a chal-
lenge, which Plath’s oeuvre has at this moment become. What do we make of such
indecent, ob-scene poetry? How do we complete/extend the circuit? As deliber-
ately incomplete extensions into the world, Plath’s later poems teach us to truly
communicate with them, not as judges or litigators but as empathic relays in the
spirit of Plath’s proclamation that “It is a heart / This holocaust I walk in” (CP 257).
Notes
1 The case of one of the most famous Victorian mediums and the psychiatrist who
wrote a study of her entitled From India to the Planet Mars is to the point here:
[Hélène] Smith’s psychic automatism (and [Théodore] Flournoy’s
depiction of it) also evinces the modernist fascination with auto-
mation. In the preface to his study, Flournoy laments that the
French equivalent of the English term “automatist” has not gained
general acceptance, and that he must consequently retain the
more spiritually connotative “medium” in his exposition (7)....
Etymologically speaking, Flournoy has no need to worry about
his chosen terminology. The technological use of the word “me-
dium” precedes its spiritual use by over 200 years. The “domi-
nant” spiritual meaning of the word does not appear in print until
10 years after the invention of photography. As for Smith herself,
her “triple mediumship: visual, auditive, and typtological” (9)
corresponds to each major ‘medium’ at the turn of the century—
film, gramophone, and typewriter....Conversely, the media that
Smith simulated are ghostly in their own right..... even the ancient
technology of writing has its own god, Thoth, who was a proto-
type of Hermes and the intimate relationship between all things
technical and spiritual. The oldest surviving depiction of a print
shop takes the form of a danse macabre; telegraphy leads to
table rapping and other connections to the beyond; photogra-
phy leads to spirit photos; telephones, radio, and sound record-
ings lead to spirit voices. (Clinton 11-12)
2 As dated by the Lilly Library.
3 This is my “psychoanalytic” deduction from the somewhat vituperative letters
concerning the article in PMLA’s subsequent issue.
4 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the Latin preposition is spatial
term that is spatially indeterminate, which can mean, among other things, “in the
direction of, towards, [or] against.”
5 Ariel, in Hebrew, can alternately designate “altar,” “lion of God,” and “Jerusalem.”
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